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Introduction 
I have been asked to speak today about some new developments in ‘critical pedagogy’, particularly 
around the education of hope and its relationship to social justice. Before doing so, however, I would 
like to situate this paper in the framework set out by Cummings in the summary paper of the first 
seminar in this series. The paper highlights four types of ‘interventions’ now being taken, by the 
state and a whole range of non-state organisations, to promote emotional well-being in education: 
(1) urgent interventions for those with special needs of care, (2) the general promotion of positive 
attitudes and attributes in schools and universities, (3) extra support for emotional damage and 
stress, and (4) the systematic teaching of subjects that will be useful in developing emotional 
competence and management, especially to ‘prepare them for the rapid change and uncertainty of 
modern life’ (Cummings 2009: 3-4). This typology clearly covers a wide range of formal educational 
practices, from ‘nurture groups’ and ‘buddy schemes’ to positive psychology, ‘stress workshops’, and 
the writing of new university curricula for ‘lifelong learning’. It also includes other sorts of 
educational interventions that I have seen or been engaged with more internationally, such as liberal 
humanities education in the United States and (what I consider to be) a very well-financed and very 
ideologically-driven movement to institutionalise ‘civic education’ and ‘critical thinking’ in the former 
Soviet republics of Central Asia.
i
  
However, there is little space within it for alternative kinds of educational interventions, 
including projects in critical pedagogy, which tend to be non-state (although often engaged within 
state institutions such as schools and universities) or informal. The term is of course a loose one and, 
because it encapsulates a broad ‘set of heterogeneous ideas’, stemming from a range of traditions in 
critical theory, pedagogical philosophy and political struggle, it can mean very contradictory things 
(Darder et al. 2002: 2).
ii
 It has been used to refer equally to a broad ‘commitment to the ideals and 
practices of social justice within schools’, the ‘transformation of those structures and conditions 
within society which function to thwart the democratic participation of all people’, and education 
aimed at empowering—politically, economically and emotionally—popular movements associated 
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with the rights of workers, women and children, people from oppressed and marginalized ethnic 
groups, the homeless and landless and stateless, and the very poor (where the concept of 
‘emotional well-being’ shows up less often than basic ideals of human dignity). It also signifies a 
particular range of democratically organised, process-oriented, inquiry-based and problem-focused 
pedagogies. The idea of critical pedagogy is perhaps most commonly associated with the work of 




For the purposes of this seminar, I am particularly interested in some of the newest 
developments in each of these fields, which, as one set of authors put it, are developing ‘educational 
spaces, pedagogical strategies, and intellectual subjectivities...[that] can be considered radically 
utopian in that they strive to transcend what is conceivable within the current socio-economic order 
around the globe’, and which, ‘despite [their] diversity...are working towards a common goal of 
understanding, combating and creating alternatives to what we are now repeatedly told is a 
glorious—and inevitable—“new world order”’ (Coté et al. 2007: 4). I would like to clarify that this is 
not intended as a totalizing argument; in other words, it will not necessarily apply to everyone or all 
kinds of work, it applies most directly to higher and informal education, and I am certainly not 
promoting a single model of education. I would merely like to fill in some gaps that I have seen in the 
debate, and raise questions about some things that seem to be taken too much for granted in public 
discourses on education. 
It might be argued that it is irrelevant to include critical pedagogy in this broad mix of 
educational ‘interventions’ into changing the human subject, as these projects share in common 
with the more ‘mainstream’ ones an underlying assumption that the formation, reformation and 
transformation of the human subject—of our attitudes, values and beliefs; of what Pierre Bourdieu 
once called our habitus or deep, materially-rooted subconscious dispositions; and of our emotional 
sensitivities and capabilities—is a necessary, and in some cases even a sufficient, condition for 
bringing about major and sometimes even revolutionary kinds of social change. Indeed, some of the 
tenets of ‘emotional well-being’ such as respect for human worth and dignity and esteem for self 
and others, are the same. However, I would argue that engaging the particular philosophies and 
practices of critical pedagogy is important for the debates developing here because they often 
operate with different conceptions of both the human subject and ‘emotional well-being’, and the 
relationship of these to economic and political forces. First, most of the political and pedagogical 
interventions mentioned above share a basic constellation of assumptions which links liberal 
capitalism to liberal democracy, liberal democracy to liberal education, liberal education to 
individual freedom and social tolerance, and individual freedom and social tolerance to well-being. 
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The constellation of assumptions grounding most critical pedagogy articulates different relationships 
between the state, the market and the educational system, and between the individual human being 
and social experience. Second, from a critical perspective, ‘emotional well-being’ is not seen as a 
subjective state to be accomplished by individuals in spite of or within their social circumstances, but 
an inter-subjective one that emerges as a result of becoming a person, amongst others, in conditions 
that enable human fulfilment, as well as through the process of creating these conditions 
themselves. In contrast to values of stoicism, optimism and being ‘in-the-moment’, in other words, 
there is an emphasis on resistance, critical hope and transcendence. And finally, although projects in 
critical pedagogy are still marginal within formal education in Britain, they are becoming increasingly 
mainstreamed, increasingly globalised, and they are advancing a new politics of ‘well-being’ that is in 
direct opposition to the kinds of education and definitions of well-being mentioned above, and as 
part of a broader opposition to the neoliberal and Third-Way theories of state and market in which 
they are embedded. They therefore not only present alternatives, but raise questions about some of 
the underlying assumptions of these taken-for-granted practices.  
There is also another reason for discussing new projects in critical pedagogy here, which is 
that they re-open debates about the biopolitical nature of transformative education itself. I use the 
word ‘biopolitical’ deliberately, although not without caution and some reservation. Most people 
engaged in critical pedagogy understand themselves to be anti-biopolitical, for in social theory the 
term really signifies one thing: the institutions, bodies of knowledge and administrative techniques 
that are used for ‘measuring, regulating and controlling people and behaviour in order to ensure 
that states get the most out of their human resources’ (Danaher 2000: 80). Michel Foucault used it 
to describe the kinds of power that manage human subjectivities through ‘universities, schools, 
barracks, and workshops’, through policies on natality, public health, housing and migration, and 
more recently through ‘health and safety’, insurance, etc. (Foucault 1976, 2003).
iv
 Indeed, many 
critical educators regard most of the formal and state-led interventions mentioned above as being, 
in some way, connected to this general disciplining of society; to the neutralisation of or 
accommodation to the psychological, emotional and even physical dissonance that its injustices can 
create. There is no question in my mind as to what Foucault might have said about the new forms of 
‘therapeutic education’ or ‘technologies of the self’ in schooling that this seminar has highlighted as 
a matter for debate. Critical pedagogy is hence understood as an antidote to the biopolitical; a form 
and practice of education which resists the state’s determination of and intervention into the body, 
the emotions and the ‘movements of life’, even if these are almost always presented as progressive 
acts of reform (Foucault 1976: 142). Its self-understanding of liberation, of transforming 
consciousness as part of transforming the world, of being aesthetically and politically motivating, of 
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educating empathy and of engendering hope is all situated in direct opposition to the governing, 
regulating, subjugating and pacifying effects of modern bio-power itself. 
However, there is another important sense in which critical pedagogy can and should be 
considered a biopolitical practice, and I think that denying this simply to avoid the term’s fixed 
connotations is to miss important opportunities for the development of reflexive educational 
practices, and for the expansion of our understandings of the politics of emotion and morality in 
education, and its relationship to political economy and cultural politics. First, critical pedagogy does 
aspire to ‘change the subject’, to educate both emotions (love, hope, empathy, etc.) and instincts 
(needs and desires) for purposes of personal and social improvement.
v
 This is not Foucault’s 
‘governmentality’, or the production of internally motivated citizens who are useful, docile, 
productive and—it must be said—‘happy’ (Foucault 1988a); indeed, it aspires to produce, if not the 
opposite, then at least the possibility for people to resist these processes. But it does also require 
people to perform ‘operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and ways of being’ 
in order to reach a particular state of ‘happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality’ 
(Foucault 1988b), and as a result is not beyond relations of power. On the other hand, however, 
from Foucault’s perspective, we may also think of the ‘transformation of one’s self by one’s own 
knowledge’ (cited in Kompridis 2006: 175) as a practice of freedom, a care of the self, in which 
‘attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain a certain mode of being’ enable people to 
define their own ‘admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society’ (Foucault 1997: 
283). It is also, according to Stanley Cavell, ‘the description of something we might call education’ 
(cited in Kompridis 2006: 176). 
In other words, rather than understanding critical pedagogy as anti-biopolitical, I argue that 
it is perhaps more enabling to regard it as offering alternative ways of conceptualising the politics of 
the self within the neoliberal order. I would thus like to talk now about how and why critical 
pedagogy in Britain and more globally is turning towards the biopolitical; how it is re-imagining the 
relationship between subjective change and a particular kind of social transformation; and how it 
understands the possible roles and limitations of formal education in making this link. I will focus on 
one particular element of this complex discussion—the problem of educating ‘hope’—and I will try 
to relate it to some of the questions raised about ‘emotional well-being’ in the previous seminar. 
 
Postmodern capitalism—the ‘end of social dreams’? 
Why hope, and what does this have to do with subjectivity and ‘emotional well-being’? Beyond the 
perhaps obvious revival of hope in mainstream party politics (e.g., Barack Obama’s ‘audacity of 
hope’ and David Cameron’s critique of the new ‘politics of fear’), it has become relatively 
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commonplace within critical social theory to speak about the ‘crisis of hope’ as a social condition to 
be observed, described and acted upon (Bauman 2004; Habermas 1989; Jameson 2004; Zournazi 
2002). Frederic Jameson recently argued that the ‘waning of the utopian idea is a fundamental 
historical and political symptom, which deserves diagnosis in its own right’ (Jameson 2004: 41, 36),
vi
 
and in a recently published collection of interviews about hope with intellectuals and cultural 
workers, Mary Zournazi concludes that ‘we live in a world where our belief, faith and trust in political 
or individual actions are increasingly being threatened, leading to despair and uncertainty’ (2002: 
14). These are not anxieties about individualised emotional states, but about the privatization of 
public life, the disarticulation of ‘the social’ and collective social responsibility, the censorship of 
democratic cultures and enclosure of relatively autonomous public spheres, the decline of sustained 
social movements, the empowerment of new, aggressive forms of military and cultural imperialism, 
the commercialization of culture and identity, and the drift in democratic societies towards more 
authoritarian forms of political and ideological control.
vii
 This constellation of related phenomena is 
generally associated with ‘neoliberalism’. 
Significantly, these conditions are also said to contribute to what Brazilian educator and 
activist Paulo Freire once described as the ‘inflexible negation of the right to dream differently, to 
dream of utopia’ (2001: 22). Freire’s use of the term ‘right’ is telling, for his judgment is based on a 
belief that human beings possess a natural ‘utopian impulse’; a longing to be that is unjustly, albeit 
often unconsciously, suppressed or unlearned within this social order. As he concluded more bluntly, 
‘the absence of hope is not the “normal” way to be human. It is a distortion.’ Others share the view; 
for example, Zygmunt Bauman (2004) has argued that ‘to hope is to be human’, and Darren Webb 
recently claimed that hope is a ‘human universal that can be experienced in different modes’ (2007: 
65). However, it is also argued that this normality of hope and the deviant nature of its suppression 
are existentialist insofar as affective experiences of ‘revolt, need, hope, rejection and desire’ are 
socially constituted, and that they are made possible—or not—from particular kinds of social 
experiences within particular historical conditions (de Beauvoir 1948). Hence, the boundary between 
the ‘emotional’ and the ‘social’ is fluid in this narrative of social decline, as its root
viii
 is said to be the 
loss of the human capacity or the will to desire hope itself, either because individuals have lost the 
ability or desire to imagine alternative ways of being (i.e., through the erosion of both critical and 
anticipatory forms of consciousness), or because they are deprived of the structural possibilities of 
agency that might have otherwise made this hope possible.
ix
  
These arguments are theoretically significant because they go beyond tactical critiques of 
particular social problems and suggest pathological changes in the quality and total way of being in 
contemporary societies. In other words, the question is no longer whether certain social 
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arrangements are possible or desirable, but rather whether the entire organization of the social 
environment disables people from developing the psychological and emotional desire for personal 
transcendence or social change, and prevents them from developing the inter-subjective empathy 
and compassion that would allow them to identify with the suffering of others. The contemporary 
crisis of hope is not simply a shift in ways of knowing or behaving in society, but as C. Wright Mills 
once wrote, a concern about ‘pervasive transformations of the very “nature” of man [sic] and the 
conditions and aims of his life’ (1959: 13).  
 
Critical pedagogy and the ‘crisis of hope’ 
New interventions in critical pedagogy are a direct response to this, and are conceptualized both as 
an ‘educational dimension of the struggles within and against neo-liberalism’ (Coté et al. 2007: 3), 
and as forms of democratic political pedagogy (Jameson 1984; Giroux 2004a). Significantly, however,  
they are being framed not in terms of ‘emotional well-being’, but by a concern that ‘the forces that 
were to bring about the transformation [of capitalist society] are suppressed and appear to be 
defeated’ (Marcuse 1989: 63). This focus on the ideational and on deep subjectivity marks a shift 
away from more traditional understandings of critical pedagogy, which are often grounded 
pragmatically in specific political struggles, and which emphasise the importance of 
‘conscientization’ (Freire 1992, 2001, 2005). In this perspective, it has been assumed that by ‘re-
cognizing’ their existing perceptions of the world more critically and identifying both their ‘limit 
situations’ and the concrete actions that can be taken to overcome them, people can become 
conscious of their existing desire for freedom and transcendence. It is argued that this, in turn, 
motivates them to engage in transformative action for changing their social conditions both 
individually and with others.  
However, many critical educators are now asking what relevance this approach to pedagogy 
might have in situations where the desire for individual transcendence and social change appears to 
be absent, devalued or denied. What are the possible consequences of conscientization when 
exposing complex power relations emboldens fatalistic emotions rather than transforming them into 
hope; where, to paraphrase a well-worn theory, we see through ideologies and yet still buy into 
them? What become of efforts to democratize knowledge when publics democratically demand 
authoritarian teaching, or when self-realization is defined as the skilful adaptation to the existing 
order of things? In response to such questions, American educator Henry Giroux has argued that 
critical pedagogy is no longer simply a matter of ‘raising consciousness’ about the possibilities for 
realistic personal and social change, but of educating people to believe that these possibilities are 
worthwhile in the first place (1997: 28). This is neither an education to re-cognize the social world, 
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nor one to create conditions of emancipatory communication in educational contexts. Instead, it 
aims to produce the value orientations that make both of these activities meaningful in the first 
place, or to produce the conditions for their possibility (which, I would argue, are two qualitatively 
different things). Institutionalized critical education has become a project less in the service of 
particular political struggles and more of an attempt to work against the atomisation, apathy, and 
emotional ‘coldness’ that are presumed to abort struggles for social justice at their immediate roots 
of subjective experience. This type of educational practice moves beyond intervening in behaviour or 
cognitive rationality, and takes on the task of transforming psychological, emotional, and ethical 
experiences—the ‘more-than-rational’ and ‘less-than-rational’ dimensions of human action (Ahmed 
2004; Anderson 2006; Anderson and Harrison 2006) as well as transforming the economic and 
political organisation of education to make this possible. In this context, the definition of ‘critical 
hope’ shifts: criticality is not simply an ability to recognize injustice, but also to be ‘moved to change 
it’ (Burbules and Berk 1999: 50). This shift represents a migration from traditional ‘pedagogies of 
hope’ towards alternative traditions in the ‘education of desire’. 
 
Classical roots of critical–utopian education 
From a critical perspective, these are things that can and should be accomplished through education, 
but they are not necessarily compatible with either state-led reforms or conceptions of ‘emotional 
well-being’. To formulate alternatives, therefore, many critical educators have begun to rework 
classical theories of critical–utopian education. Four thinkers in particular—Ernst Bloch, Erich 
Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno—now appear regularly to inform questions of how 
need and desire are constituted within particular social systems, and how they might be radically 
reconstituted within the same.  
Ernst Bloch’s work, for example, has recently been invoked by educators aiming to inspire 
‘critical hope’, defined as the ‘desire for a better way of living expressed in the description of a 
different kind of society that makes possible that alternative way of life’ (Levitas 1993: 257). Like 
Freire, Bloch defined hope as an ontological fact: ‘not only a basic feature of human consciousness, 
but, concretely and correctly grasped, a basic determination within objective reality as a whole’ 
(Bloch 1985: 7); hopelessness being ‘downright intolerable to human needs’ (Bloch 2005: 5). 
However, he argued, if hope remains ‘uneducated’, without guidance about how to  formulate 
‘informed discontent’, it can become a dangerously abstract form of fantasy which Bloch called 
‘fraudulent hope’ (i.e., ideology). The role of education, therefore, is to help people develop a 
‘critical hermeneutics of everyday life’; to learn ways of ‘educated hope’ (docta spes), rather than 
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engaging in ‘wishful thinking’ or developing an ‘optimistic’ disposition (for contemporary 
applications, see Giroux 2007: 33).  
Although Bloch’s theory of ‘educated hope’ seems widely shared, his commitment to a 
particular vision of socialism as the natural culmination of all human dreams and desires was not 
assumed critical theorists or educators. In To Have or To Be? (1976), for instance, Erich Fromm 
argued that as practiced, both capitalism and socialism were modernist distortions of human hope. 
Like Bloch, he believed that under ‘normal’ conditions ‘human beings have an inherent and deeply 
rooted desire to be: to express our faculties, to be active, to be related to others, to escape the 
prison cell of selfishness’ (1976: 103; 2001: 247).
x
 But Fromm also believed that the human character 
has the potential to be shaped otherwise by any socio-economic system that requires it (Rickert 
1986: 360). To restore the normality of human desire to realize unlimited potentials, he argued, it 
was necessary to produce a ‘radical change of the human heart’ as well as effecting ‘drastic 
economic and social changes…that give the human heart the chance for change and the courage and 
vision to achieve it’ (1976: 19).
xi
 This, he argued, would be an essentially ‘educational process’ of 
change (ibid. 173).  
Herbert Marcuse also prioritized this relationship between subjective and objective change; 
between emotional experience and material realities. Marcuse believed that political injustices were 
internalized into the deep psychological structures of individuals, and that the potential for social 
change was thus instinctually rooted (Rickert 1986: 368). He thus placed deep subjectivity at the 
heart of social change, requiring a ‘radical transvaluation of values’ and needs (Marcuse 1971: 15). 
Marcuse differentiated, controversially, between ‘true’ and ‘false’ needs in any society, the latter 
referring to any needs that ‘perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice’—not only for 
oneself, but also for others upon whom our personal ‘happiness’ may depend (1964: 5). Hence, for 
Marcuse, education was to play a central role in a cultural revolution that prioritized the 
transformation of instinctual needs themselves. He advocated not only ‘liberating the consciousness 
of…realizable possibilities’, but also argued that cultural revolutionaries should ‘work on the 
development of consciousness’ (Marcuse 1970: 74), on creating a ‘new sensibility’ at the level of 
‘second nature’ or ‘socialized instinct’ (Marcuse 1969: 21), and on ‘transforming the will itself so that 
people no longer want what they want now’ (Marcuse 1970: 77).  
Finally, while Theodor Adorno also addressed the cultural formation of needs, desires and 
values and envisioned a strong role for education in this process, he remained extremely critical of 
the limits of formal education, and mindful of the role that it has played in shaping anti-democratic 
attitudes and relationships. In his 1967 essay ‘Education after Auschwitz’, for example, he asserted 
that the deliberate formation of subjective human psychology was the only legitimate defence 
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against an insurgent ‘barbarism [which] is inscribed within the principle of civilization’ (1967: 1). 
Here he parts company with Bloch, Fromm and Marcuse, whose theories assumed that education 
was ultimately a corrective practice which aimed to restore some state of normality against the 
pathological emotional pedagogies of late-modern capitalism. For Adorno (1967), the problem was 
darker: Auschwitz, the Armenian genocide, the dropping of atomic bombs—and unfortunately we 
can of course cite much more recent examples of calculated mass murder—these were not 
anomalous events but rather ‘expressions of an extremely powerful societal tendency’ towards 
dehumanization that is an ever-present potentiality within human beings, emboldened under some 
conditions and repressed in others. He argued that many educational practices—in schools, but also 
in the more public pedagogies of mass culture—produced individuals who were psychologically 
‘cold’: unable to love others empathetically or to relate to their suffering and desires.
xii
 Adorno 
agreed with Fromm and Marcuse that it would be an authoritarian irony to ‘force’ people to love, 
and that there was no purpose to ‘appeal to eternal values, at which the very people who are prone 
to commit such atrocities would merely shrug their shoulders’. He argued that critical education 
must instead attempt to elicit the need for love within individuals who do not experience it through 
a process of critical self-reflection, and the capability for what he called civic ‘maturity’ (Adorno and 
Becker 1991). ‘If anything can help against coldness as the condition for disaster’, he wrote, ‘then it 
is the insight into the conditions that determine it and the attempt to combat those conditions, 
initially in the domain of the individual’ (1967: 9).  
These classical examples, which are being rehabilitated in some contemporary critical 
pedagogy, illustrate that the concepts of need, desire and hope were central concerns of 
educational practice long before the rise of neoliberal ‘therapeutic education’, and outside of or in 
opposition to statist projects of social welfare. However, one thing in particular differentiates them 
from educational projects which emphasise ‘emotional well-being’. They require an explanation of 
why a social system which proliferates relations of disrespect for human life and self-actualisation 
frequently does not result in cognitive or emotional dissonance, but rather ‘appeals to our intuitions 
and instincts, to our values and desires’ to the extent that it becomes ‘so embedded in common 
sense as to be taken for granted and not open for question’ (Harvey 2007: 5). In other words, they 
raise the question of why we are lacking, in the words of Frederic Jameson, the ‘desire called utopia’ 
(2005) which might justify critical interpretations of our social reality as presently imagined. 
 
The problems of ‘educating desire’ 
The project of producing this desire is therefore now being interpreted as a primary task of critical 
pedagogy. E. P. Thompson (1976) borrowed the term ‘education of desire’ from Miguel Abensour 
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(1973), to defend the value of utopianism in critical thought.
xiii
 Long before the rise of ‘sociology of 
emotions’ or ‘emotional well-being’, Abensour argued that we must recognise the material force of 
subjective factors such as emotion, need, desire and hope in radical social change and social justice. 
The ‘education of desire’ hence departs from the rationalist philosophy of ‘consciousness-raising’ by 
recognizing the affective and imaginative conditions of social action— asserting, in other words, the 
merits of utopianism as a means of cultural transformation and resistance. This practice is now being 
asserted as one of the most appropriate responses to the forces of ‘disutopia’, and to emotional ill-
being and pathology, in post-modern capitalist society.  
Contemporary critical theorists and educators rarely use the term ‘education of desire’. For 
reasons I already mentioned, most wouldn’t dare to own up to this sort of biopolitical intent. But 
they do speak frequently about things such as ‘raising ambitions, desires and real hope for those 
who wish to take seriously the issue of educational struggle and social justice’ (Burbules and Berk 
1999: 51).
xiv
 This places them in a complicated situation: they are often—though certainly not 
always—challenged, resisted and resented by the people and institutions they claim to want to 
‘emancipate’. One response to this has been to interpret apathy towards or resistance to critical 
pedagogy as a consequence of an existential colonization by the prevailing logics of power.
xv
 In other 
words, critical educators sometimes interpret the absence of, denial of or indifference towards the 
‘crisis of hope’ as symptomatic of the crisis itself. It is here that I think there is an uncomfortable 
similarity between the new biopolitics of critical pedagogy and the governmentality of some of the 
more state-driven and/or mainstream interventions. We must then raise the same question asked 
about the four types of intervention mentioned in Cummings’s paper: to what extent are these 
practices benign and progressive, or authoritarian? Who determines appropriate or desirable ways 
of thinking, feeling and being, and at what point in an educational process or relationship are such 
decisions made? In other words, if we cannot justify normative standards of justice and well-being 
outside of what is presently known and accepted, and if we cannot arrogate value for any vision that 
is not universally and democratically shared by others, must the entire critical project be abandoned 
in order so that we can embrace and ‘manage’ our present ‘reality’? (Honneth 2007: 50) 
 
Conclusion 
Critical pedagogy has something important to offer here precisely because it asserts that this very 
question must be placed at the heart of educational practice, and that it must be an open 
problematic for dialogue and debate in practice. From a critical perspective, while there can be many 
ideas of ‘emotional well-being’ and ‘social justice’, there can be no authoritative definitions of these 
ideas which are not constituted in practice by the people for whom the categories might matter in 
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the first place. The fundamental task is therefore not to teach people to feel about themselves or 
others in a particular, much less in a determined way, and it is not necessarily connected to 
immediate feelings of ‘well-being’. Rather, the aim is to enable people to understand why they have 
certain feelings, desires and needs; why, perhaps, they do not have or are not ‘supposed’ to have 
others; and to critically imagine conditions in which radical alternatives may be possible. 
One of the most significant elements of this approach is that the psychological and 
emotional well-being of individuals is neither explained by nor isolated from the economic, political 
and cultural forces that they navigate in their everyday lives, or from the material conditions of their 
existence. I will finish by illustrating this through one example from Chandra Talpade Mohanty, a 
feminist academic and activist. In a recent book called Feminism without Borders, she reflected on a 
series of ‘prejudice reduction’ workshops offered by her university during the 1980s in response to a 
series of racist and homophobic attacks on campus. Analogies may be drawn here to current 
projects promoting ‘multicultural values’ in the face of rising Islamophobia and xenophobia. The 
workshops, conducted by counsellors, psychologists and educators, aimed at ‘unlearning racism’, 
‘sensitizing’ students to issues of racial difference and conflict, and promoting values of pluralism. Of 
this, Mohanty says: 
prejudice reduction workshops draw on a psychologically based “race relations” analysis and 
focus on “prejudice” rather than on institutional or historical domination [and] often aim for 
emotional release rather than political action. The name of this approach is itself somewhat 
problematic, since it suggests that “prejudice” (rather than domination, exploitation, or 
structural inequality) is the core problem and that we have to “reduce” it. [...] In focusing on 
the “healing of past wounds” this approach also equates the positions of dominant and 
subordinate groups, erasing all power inequalities and hierarchies. And finally, the location 
of the source of “oppression” and “change” in individuals suggests an elision between 
ideological and structural understandings of power and domination and individual, 
psychological understandings of power (2003: 209). 
 
In other words, the emotion-work in critical pedagogy, its biopolitical concern with subjective 
transformation, is not intended as a therapeutic intervention or a method for the management of 
emotions, social pacification, or social cohesion. This is not to argue that therapeutic interventions 
are without value; as Mohanty points out, they can ‘set a positive tone for social change’ and can 
certainly be effective at the level of individual contentment. But from the perspective of critical 
pedagogy, in most—or perhaps even in all—of the interventions into ‘emotional well-being’ 
mentioned in Cummings’s paper, the ‘baseline is still maintaining the status quo’, the aim being to 
educate emotionally ‘balanced’ people to live productive lives in a structurally unequal society. For, 
as Mohanty argues, ‘if complex structural experiences of domination and resistance can be 
ideologically reformulated as individual behaviours and attitudes, they can be managed while 
carrying on business as usual’ (2003: 210). And, to quote Kathryn Ecclestone, ‘building confidence 
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and paying some attention to the affective aspects of learning while educating people, as some 
teachers did in the context of the social struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, is not at all the same as 
building “self-esteem” now in a context of no political struggle and, arguably, no politics at all’ 
(2008). 
This brings us directly back to Foucault’s notion of biopolitics as a form of power exercised 
through institutions, bodies of knowledge and administrative techniques that are used for 
‘measuring, regulating and controlling people and behaviour in order to ensure that states get the 
most out of their human resources’ (Danaher 2000: 80). How then might these interventions be re-
imagined through the lens of a critical pedagogy? I do not have plans or proposals, but as I have 
been asked to go beyond negative critique, I can offer some suggestions. These may sound like 
generalised platitudes here, but they are in fact practices now being undertaken in Britain, and 
more-so elsewhere, in the marginal and marginalized locations where critical pedagogy thrives. The 
‘general promotion of positive attitudes and attributes in schools and universities’ may be 
accompanied by, or transformed into, the general democratisation of relationships in education, the 
expansion of anti-oppressive pedagogies throughout the curriculum, and the education of ‘informed 
discontent’ and political agency. Against individualised systems of assessment and evaluation which 
reward competition far more than self-actualisation and which sustain myths of meritocracy where 
none exists, we might make possible the development of actual learning publics. Teachers and 
students can dedicate time not only to understanding what economic and social conditions might 
‘give the human heart the chance for change and the courage and vision to achieve it’ (Marcuse 
1976: 19), but also work to create ‘cultures of dissent’ which make the underlying power relations of 
students’ everyday lives into problems of personal and public pedagogy (Mohanty 2003: 216).
xvi
 
Rather than preparing subjects which prepare students to emotionally manage the ‘rapid change 
and uncertainty of modern life’ (Cummings 2009: 3), we might help them in their ‘attempts to 
develop and transform’ themselves, and to attain a certain mode of being’ that may enable the 
independent definition of ‘admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society’ 
(Foucault 1997: 283)—ones that do not necessarily conform to the horizons imagined in the existing 
neoliberal model. We can, in other words, find new ways of educating the desire to be fully human 
and the hope that this is possible through better understanding the complex relationships between 
subjective and social transformation; between hope and social justice. I thus suggest that it is 
possible to develop a critical, alternative conception of the biopolitics of pedagogy—one which 
regards encounters between the biographical and the political, and experiences of emotional 
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